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“Outsmarting” Death by Putting
Capital Punishment on Life Support
THE NEED FOR UNIFORM STATE EVALUATIONS OF
THE INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED IN THE WAKE
OF HALL V. FLORIDA
“I can still tend the rabbits, George? . . . I di’n’t mean no
harm, George.”1
“Give mom a hug for me and tell her that I love her. Take
me home, Jesus. Take me home, Lord. I ain’t left yet, must be a
miracle. I am a miracle. Y’all do understand that I came here a
sinner and leaving a saint?”2
INTRODUCTION
Jerry Williams was murdered at the age of 21 outside a
convenience store in Beaumont, Texas, in 1992.3 Williams was
a confidential informant for the police department and provided
a tip that resulted in the arrest of Marvin Lee Wilson and Andrew
Lewis for possession of cocaine.4 Wilson and Lewis sought
Williams out for payback for snitching, and after a verbal
altercation with Williams, kidnapped, physically beat, and
ultimately shot him to death.5 Wilson was sentenced to death for
the crime, and he appealed, arguing that his mental development
was deficient, which made him “mentally retarded” under the

1 JOHN STEINBECK, OF MICE AND MEN 65 (Penguin Books 1993) (1937)
(quoting Lennie Small).
2 Charles Montaldo, The Last Words of Executed Prisoners: Final Statement
of Marvin Lee Wilson, ABOUT NEWS (Sept. 12, 2014), http://crime.about.com/od/anylastwords/
ig/Last-Words-of-Executed/Yokamon-Hearn.-P7j.htm [http://perma.cc/W42L-X47B].
3 Associated Press, Texas Executes Marvin Wilson Despite His Claims of Low
IQ, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 11:24 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/texas-executes-marvin-wilson-claims-iq-article-1.1131326 [hereinafter Texas
Executes Marvin Wilson].
4 Id.; Marvin Lee Wilson, MURDERPEDIA, http://murderpedia.org/male.W/w/
wilson-marvin-lee.htm [http://perma.cc/2XYA-4HN9] (last visited June 21, 2016).
5 Texas Executes Marvin Wilson, supra note 3.
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law and thus exempt from execution.6 The highest court found
that Wilson did not suffer from intellectual disability, and the state
of Texas proceeded with Wilson’s execution by lethal injection on
August 7, 2012.7 Prior to his execution, Wilson’s IQ test showed
that he had an IQ of 61—nine points below Texas’s benchmark
score of 70 and low enough to be considered “mentally retarded.”8
Wilson’s execution came after the Supreme Court’s 2002
decision in Atkins v. Virginia in which the Court categorically
held that the execution of those suffering from mental retardation
constituted cruel and unusual punishment inconsistent with the
protections of the Eighth Amendment.9 The Court in Atkins,
however, left it to the states to develop their own methods for
determining whether a particular individual is intellectually
disabled.10 For example, according to Texas courts, an individual
only reaches the level of intellectual disability that would
preclude the state from carrying out an execution if he or she
displays certain descriptive character traits—traits that are based
on the character Lennie Small from John Steinbeck’s classic
novel Of Mice and Men.11 As a result, despite Wilson arguably
falling below what is considered intellectually deficient in
many professional circles and the Texas statute, he was not
sufficiently disabled, according to the Texas legislature, to be
exempt from execution.12
More than a decade after Marvin Lee Wilson’s execution,
the Supreme Court again tackled the issue of the execution of the
intellectually disabled in its 2014 decision, Hall v. Florida.13
While the Court both reaffirmed the concerns raised in Atkins
6 John Rudolf, Marvin Wilson Execution: Texas Puts Man with 61 IQ to
Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012
/08/07/marvin-wilson-execution-texas_n_1753968.html [http://perma.cc/AH2Z-PXN5];
Wilson v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 81, No. 12-5349, 2012 WL 3186106, at *2 (petition for cert.
filed July 19, 2012).
7 Rudolf, supra note 6; see Wilson v. Thaler, 450 F. App’x 369, 371 (5th Cir.
2011), writ for cert. denied, Wilson v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. (2012) (per curiam).
8 Id.
9 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
10 Id. at 317. The terms “mental retardation” and “mentally retarded” have
widely been replaced with the terminology “intellectual disability” and “intellectually
disabled.” As such, throughout this note the terms based in the root “intellectual
disability” will be used as opposed to terms based in “mental retardation.” AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY (2013), http://www.dsm5.org/documents/
intellectual%20disability%20fact%20sheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/9JRH-TH8Y]. For further
discussion on the evolution of this terminology, see infra notes 22-24 and
accompanying text.
11 Diana Wray, Updated Texas Uses Of Mice and Men Standards to Execute
Mentally Disabled Man, HOUS. PRESS (Jan. 30, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.houstonpress.
com/news/updated-texas-uses-of-mice-and-men-standards-to-execute-mentally-disabled
-man-6728580 [http://perma.cc/3EZG-599C].
12 Rudolf, supra note 6.
13 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
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that the execution of the intellectually disabled constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment and further stated that a “bright-line”
IQ test-score cutoff is unconstitutional, it once again did not
provide a method for states to evaluate a particular defendant’s
potential intellectual disability.14 The Court suggested factors that
courts should consider, but its holding was limited to finding
impermissible the use of a bright-line IQ score as a complete bar
to presenting other evidence of intellectual disability.15
This note argues that to prevent the improper execution
of intellectually disabled capital defendants under Atkins and
Hall, there must be a uniform method for states to evaluate a
defendant’s intellectual abilities. Part I of this note provides
background information on intellectual disabilities and the
history of state death penalty statutes. Part II examines the
Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia and the changes to
state statutes post-Atkins. Part III analyzes the Court’s recent
decision in Hall v. Florida, which affirms the categorical exclusion
of the intellectually disabled from capital punishment but does
not establish metrics for evaluating which defendants are
intellectually disabled. Finally, Part IV proposes a method for
evaluating a defendant’s potential intellectual disability in light
of the Hall decision and argues that this method should be
adopted nationwide. Specifically, the note suggests that states,
when determining a capital defendant’s intellectual ability,
should take a three-pronged approach that considers conceptual,
social, and practical factors. Such a holistic examination comports
with evolving standards of decency and would assist courts in
making an accurate judgment, ensuring that those who are truly
intellectually disabled are exempt from execution.
I.

INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND DEATH PENALTY
STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES

A.

Intellectual Disability

The American Association of Intellectual and
Development Disabilities (AAIDD) defines intellectual disability
as “a disability characterized by significant limitations in both
intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior.”16 Poor adaptive
functioning affects many ordinary day-to-day aspects of life
Id. at 1990, 1996.
Id. at 2001.
16 Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N OF INTELLECTUAL AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#.VFVt1NR
4qfw [http://perma.cc/RVG4-PNML] (last visited June 21, 2016).
14
15
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such as money and time management, social skills, and
occupational abilities, among others.17 Intellectual disability
manifests before the age of 1818 and affects about one to three
percent of the total population.19 One of the primary tools mental
health professionals use in evaluating patients and making
diagnoses is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM).20 The American Psychiatric Association (APA)
published the first edition of the DSM in 1952.21 The fifth and
most recent edition, DSM-5, was released in May 2013 after
over a decade of work,22 and until its publication, intellectual
disability was referred to as mental retardation.23 This change in
terminology reflected advocates’ concerns that the term “mental
retardation” and similar terms (i.e., “retarded” and “retard”) are
now offensive to many people.24
In addition to the change in terminology, the DSM-5
also recommends a change in assessing an individual who
possibly suffers from intellectual disability.25 In particular, the
DSM-5 notes a specific concern with overemphasizing IQ scores in
determining an individual’s potential intellectual disability.26
While still allowing for the use of IQ scores in holistically
evaluating a particular individual’s level of intellectual disability,
the DSM-5 states that IQ tests and similar assessments are to be
used only in conjunction with other clinical assessment
techniques.27 The DSM-5 states that a score “two standard
deviations or more below” the average score of the population

Id.
Id.
19 Intellectual Disability, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/dis
ease/mental-retardation/overview.html [http://perma.cc/B9MT-ST9L] (last visited June
21, 2016).
20 DSM, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm [http://
perma.cc/56XN-THCV] (last visited June 21, 2016).
21 DSM: History of the Manual, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.
org/practice/dsm/dsm-history-of-the-manual [http://perma.cc/98G8-RETW] (last visited
June 21, 2016).
22 From Planning to Publication: Developing DSM-5, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
http://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-Deve
lopment-of-DSM-5.pdf [http://perma.cc/QM8X-M4JS] (last visited June 21, 2016);
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 5-6 (5th ed. 2013).
23 INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, supra note 10.
24 Change in Terminology: “Mental Retardation” to “Intellectual Disability,”
78 Fed. Reg. 46,499 (Aug. 1, 2013); Tammy Reynolds et al., History of Stigmatizing
Names for Intellectual Disabilities Continued, MENTAL HELP (May 21, 2013),
https://www.mentalhelp.net/articles/history-of-stigmatizing-names-for-intellectual-disa
bilities-continued/ [http://perma.cc/58H2-Q5QM].
25 INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, supra note 10.
26 Id.
27 Id.
17
18
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constitutes intellectual disability—this is a score of “about 70
or below.”28
B.

A Brief History of American Capital Punishment

The first execution in what is now the United States for
the punishment of criminal wrongdoing occurred in 1608 in
Virginia when Captain George Kendal was convicted for spying
for Spain.29 In the early days of American capital punishment, a
person could be sentenced to death for crimes such as stealing
grapes or striking one’s parents.30 Additionally, during
American capital punishment’s infancy, capital sentencing was
not discretionary—meaning that anyone convicted of a capital
offense was sentenced to death, regardless of outside factors or
circumstances.31 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, all states moved towards discretionary sentencing
for almost all capital crimes, while many other countries were
at the same time abandoning capital punishment entirely.32
After a sizable surge in executions in the 1920s and
1930s, the United States began to retreat from capital
punishment entirely in the early 1960s.33 In 1958, the Supreme
Court held in Trop v. Dulles that the Eighth Amendment
contains an “evolving standard[ ] of decency that mark[s] the
progress of a maturing society.”34 While the issues presented in
Trop did not involve the death penalty, many who were
opposed to capital punishment began to argue that American
societal standards of decency had evolved to a point where the
death penalty no longer complied with these standards.35
In the 1972 case Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
for the first time seriously questioned the constitutionality of
death penalty practices in the states.36 Justice Douglas,
concurring in the Court’s per curiam decision in Furman,
stated that statutes that were discretionary, and thus that
Id.
Part I: History of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty [http://perma.cc/G2E3-KAT2] (last visited
June 21, 2016).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
35 Part I: History of the Death Penalty, supra note 29; Trop, 356 U.S. 114
(discussing whether lost citizenship as a consequence for conviction by a court-martial
for wartime desertion constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment).
36 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
28
29
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allowed the state to apply the death penalty arbitrarily and
capriciously, were an unconstitutional violation of both the Eighth
Amendment’s protection against “cruel and unusual punishment”
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.37
While not a deciding factor in the Court’s holding, Justice
Douglas did note that both Furman and Branch (another
plaintiff whose case the Court combined with Furman’s for
review) were mentally deficient.38 The Court specifically
mentioned that not only did Branch have an IQ well below that
of the other inmates, but he also ranked in the bottom fourth
percentile of his grade-school class.39 While the decision in
Furman initially appeared to be a victory for opponents of the
death penalty, the Court did not outright hold the death penalty
unconstitutional—it merely questioned the constitutionality of
imposing the death penalty in the cases before it.40
Immediately after the Furman decision, many states
began rewriting their death penalty statutes to accord with the
ruling.41 A return to mandated death sentences for capital
offenses had been deemed unconstitutional by the Court in
Woodson v. North Carolina, so states that wanted to maintain
the death penalty needed to draft more refined discretionary
statutes in light of these combined rulings.42 The Court upheld
these new statutes in a series of decisions that reinstated
capital punishment in Florida, Georgia, and Texas by holding
these states’ new death penalty statutes constitutional.43 These
new statutes allowed parties to present, and juries to take into
account, both aggravating and mitigating factors surrounding
the defendant and the crime.44 These statutes also instituted
separate guilt and penalty phases of capital trials—meaning
that after a jury returned a verdict of guilty, a second
proceeding began to determine the sentence (i.e., death or some
amount of prison time).45 Finally, these statutes allowed state
courts to conduct a procedural review of these sentences to see
if a sentence was disproportionate.46 While the Court approved
these statutory changes, nowhere in Gregg v. Georgia—one in a
Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 253.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 239-40 (majority opinion).
41 Part I: History of the Death Penalty, supra note 29.
42 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
43 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
276 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
44 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163-66.
45 Id. at 164-66, 191.
46 Id. at 166-68.
37

38
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series of decisions reinstating capital punishment—did the
Court require states wishing to reinstate the death penalty to
adopt any or all of these particular changes.47
Another notable case in this realm is Hitchcock v.
Dugger.48 There the Court reaffirmed earlier decisions dealing
with jury consideration at sentencing of mitigating factors not
explicitly enumerated in a state’s death penalty statute.49 In
Hitchcock, the defendant argued that the jury was improperly
instructed that the only mitigating evidence it could consider
was the defendant’s age at the time he had committed the crime
and not evidence presented during his sentencing proceeding
regarding his difficult and tumultuous childhood.50 The Court
held that the trial court improperly prevented the jury from
considering all the mitigating factors presented to it (including
those not explicitly enumerated in the Florida statute), but it
suggested that the defendant could be sentenced to death if a
jury was properly allowed to consider the evidence of all
present mitigating factors.51
C.

State Death Penalty Statutes Post-Gregg and Pre-Atkins

The Court’s death penalty cases up to and including
Gregg addressed the legality of the death penalty generally, but
the Court never squarely wrestled with the constitutionality of
executing intellectually disabled individuals until it decided
Atkins v. Virginia. While death penalty statutes among the 50
states share many characteristics, each state has the ability to
draft its own statute defining intellectual disability. Prior to
the Court’s decision in Atkins, 18 states explicitly defined
mental retardation in their death penalty statutes.52 While
many of the states had similar definitions, each emphasized
different evaluative factors.53 For example, Arizona defined
mental retardation as “a mental deficit that has resulted in
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with significant limitations in adaptive
functioning, where the onset of the forgoing conditions occurred
See Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Part I: History of the Death Penalty, supra note 29.
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
49 Id. at 394.
50 Id. at 397-98.
51 Id. at 399.
52 State Statutes Prohibiting the Death Penalty for People with Mental
Retardation, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/statestatutes-prohibiting-death-penalty-people-mental-retardation?scid=28&did=138 [http://
perma.cc/2NFR-9R3L] (last visited May 20, 2016).
53 Id.
47

48
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before the defendant reached the age of eighteen.”54 Despite a
statutory definition that appears to necessitate a holistic
evaluation of a defendant, the Arizona statute also required
“the appointment of a licensed psychologist whose only stated
purpose was to evaluate capital defendants to determine their
IQ.”55 Prior to Atkins, Arizona was the only state that explicitly
listed “determin[ing] the defendant’s IQ” as the qualified
examiner’s purpose.56 Arkansas also explicitly referred to IQ in
its statute, which stated that “[t]here is a rebuttable presumption
of mental retardation when the defendant has an intelligence
quotient of sixty-five (65) or below.”57 The following states’ statutes
explicitly require a score of 70 or below on a standardized IQ test to
establish intellectual disability: Kentucky, Maryland, New Mexico,
Nebraska, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Washington.58 These states’ definitions of mental retardation have
become incredibly important since 2002, when the Court first
decided that it violates the Eighth Amendment to execute the
intellectually disabled but left for the states to decide how to
determine whether a capital defendant suffers from a disability.
II.

ATKINS V. VIRGINIA AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE DEATH
PENALTY STATUTES

A.

Atkins v. Virginia: Executing the Intellectually Disabled
Is “Cruel and Unusual”

Daryl Atkins was arrested and later convicted of
abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder for his
involvement in the death of Eric Nesbitt on August 16, 1996.59
Atkins committed this crime alongside William Jones, who
testified against Atkins at his trial.60 In exchange for his
testimony, the prosecution allowed Jones to plead to firstdegree murder, taking the death penalty off the table.61 Jones’s
testimony during the guilt phase of Atkins’s trial mirrored
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3982 (2016).
Id.
56 Id.; State Statutes Prohibiting the Death Penalty for People with Mental
Retardation, supra note 52.
57 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(a)(2) (2015).
58 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW
§ 412 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988) (repealed 2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2015)
(amended 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A26.2 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030
(West 2015).
59 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 307 & n.1.
54

55
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Atkins’s own testimony, except that each testified that the
other held and shot the gun used to kill Eric Nesbitt.62 Jones’s
testimony was clearer and more credible than Atkins’s,
particularly because Atkins’s testimony substantially contradicted
an earlier statement he made to the police upon his arrest.63 Jones
did not make any statements to the police after he was
arrested.64 The jury apparently credited Jones’s testimony and
found Atkins guilty.65
At the penalty phase of the trial, the defense called a
forensic psychologist, Dr. Evan Nelson, who evaluated Atkins
and determined that Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded.”66
Dr. Nelson conducted a full examination of Atkins, including
an IQ test on which Atkins scored a 59.67 During his testimony,
Dr. Nelson asserted that in his professional opinion, Atkins’s
score on the IQ test could not be an “invalid test score” because
testimony from those who knew Atkins throughout his life and
his school records demonstrated that Atkins’s “limited intellect
had been a consistent feature throughout his life.”68 In this first
sentencing, the jury was given a misleading verdict form, which
resulted in the Virginia Supreme Court ordering a second
sentencing proceeding, at which a jury again sentenced Atkins to
death.69 At this second proceeding, Dr. Stanton Samenow (on
behalf of the state) testified that in his professional opinion,
Atkins was actually of “average intelligence, at least” and
attributed his poor performance in school to the fact that
Atkins likely didn’t pay attention and “did not want to do what
he was required to do.”70
In upholding Atkins’s sentence, the Virginia Supreme
Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Penry
v. Lynaugh, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the execution of the intellectually disabled.71 Penry was
sentenced to death for raping and murdering a young woman
in Livingston, Texas, while he was out on parole for another
rape charge.72 Dr. Jerome Brown, a clinical psychologist,
examined Penry before trial and found him to be suffering from
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 307.
Id. at 307 & n.2.
Id.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 308-09 & nn.4-5.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 309-10 & n.6.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
Id. at 307.
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“mild to moderate retardation” with an IQ score of 54.73 Penry
appealed his sentence and argued that sentencing him to death
despite his intellectual disability constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.74 The Court
determined that there was not sufficient evidence to show a
national trend towards eliminating the practice of executing the
intellectually disabled, a metric often used by the Court in
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.75 While
the Court considered evidence from the American Association
on Mental Retardation76 in support of Penry’s argument that
people with intellectual disabilities lack the requisite
culpability to warrant a capital sentence, the Court did not find
the argument persuasive enough to justify excluding all those
with intellectual disabilities from capital punishment.77
The Court in Atkins noted that societal standards and
perceptions about executing the intellectually disabled had
changed greatly since the Penry decision.78 Shortly before the
Court’s decision in Penry, a case in Georgia involving an
individual suffering from intellectual disability had garnered a
great deal of national attention.79 In 1986, Jerome Bowden was
sentenced and scheduled for execution for crimes committed in
Georgia, despite being diagnosed at the age of 14 with an
intellectual disability.80 The Georgia Board of Parole granted a
stay of Bowden’s sentence in response to protests across the
state.81 Despite a report from a psychologist appointed by the
Parole Board indicating that Bowden’s IQ score was 65, the
Board concluded that Bowden had the requisite culpability and
lifted the stay on his execution, and he was executed the
following day.82 Just two years later, the Georgia legislature
passed a statute prohibiting the execution of the intellectually
disabled.83
In evaluating whether there had been a change in
societal standards of decency regarding the execution of the
Id. at 307-08.
Id. at 312.
75 Id. at 334.
76 The American Association on Mental Retardation has since changed its
name to the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
(AAID). See AM. ASS’N OF INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, https://aaidd.org/
[http://perma.cc/4886-QDC8] (last visited May 20, 2016).
77 Penry, 492 U.S. at 336-38.
78 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002).
79 Id. at 313-14; Bowden v. Zant, 260 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. 1979).
80 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 n.8.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (1988).
73

74
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intellectually disabled since the Penry decision, the Court focused
not only on the number of states that had instituted bans on the
execution of the intellectually disabled, but also on the
importance of the underlying meaning behind the adoption of
such statutes.84 Indeed, the Court specifically noted that
[g]iven the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more
popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of
violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting the execution of
mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions)
provides powerful evidence that today our society views mentally
retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average
criminal.85

The Court went on to note that when state legislatures passed
these statutes, they did so by overwhelming majorities.86 And
even in the few states that had not taken an explicit stance
against the execution of the intellectually disabled, the practice of
executing intellectually disabled offenders was extremely rare.87
The true problem, according to the Court, and the
problem that continues to plague states today, is determining
which offenders are in fact suffering from intellectual disabilities.88
In Atkins, one of the major debates (beyond the constitutionality of
executing the intellectually disabled generally) was whether or
not Atkins himself was intellectually disabled.89 The Court
acknowledged that Virginia’s concerns had merit, stating that
“[n]ot all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so
impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded
offenders about whom there is a national consensus.”90 The Court
observed that a clinical diagnosis of intellectual disability
“require[s] not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also
significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication,
self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18.”91
Despite its explicit concern about how to determine which
offenders are indeed intellectually disabled and its
acknowledgement that there is a growing national trend away
from executing such defendants, the Court simply left “to the

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 318.
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State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.”92
While the dissenters in Atkins focused primarily on what
was, in their opinion, the majority attempting to “fabricate [a]
‘national consensus’”93 against the execution of the intellectually
disabled, they also took issue with the majority purportedly
excusing those who suffer from only “mild” intellectual
disability from the death penalty.94 Justice Scalia articulated
this issue with the majority’s holding by going to great lengths
in his dissent to describe the characteristics of an “idiot” (what
Justice Scalia identified as the commonplace term for someone
suffering from severe or profound intellectual disability) in
1791, a status that at the time constituted exemption from
capital punishment.95 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s underlying concern
was not with granting immunity to those who are “severely”
intellectually disabled, but in allowing for those who are
merely “mildly” intellectually disabled to be exempted from the
death penalty absent a national consensus calling for such an
exemption.96 This concern demonstrates why an evaluative
system that is underinclusive—not exempting individuals
suffering from more minor levels of intellectual disability from
the death penalty—does not, according to Justice Scalia, raise
constitutional concerns. Defendants who are severely
intellectually disabled will likely score well below any maximum
IQ score cutoffs instituted by states. It is those defendants who
have only minor intellectual disabilities whose protection is
compromised in such systems, but it is those very defendants
who Justice Scalia took issue with exempting in his dissent in
Atkins.
Almost as an afterthought, the dissenters also expressed
concern that the symptoms of intellectual disability “can
readily be feigned.”97 Justice Scalia mentioned that the risk of
capital defendants “faking it” to achieve an exemption is not
present in the mentally ill because at least there the defendant
“risks commitment to a mental institution until he can be
cured (and then tried and executed).”98 Justice Scalia argued
that the defendant who feigns intellectual disability risks
92 Id. at 317 (alteration in original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 405, 416-17 (1986)).
93 Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 340.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 340-41.
97 Id. at 353.
98 Id.
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nothing at all.99 Because a defendant who asserts a defense
based on another mental illness, such as schizophrenia, will be
institutionalized until he is deemed competent to stand trial,
any potential benefit from faking a mental illness is
outweighed by the consequence of institutionalization. Unlike
the mentally ill, the intellectually disabled do not risk any such
similar consequence, as intellectually disabled defendants
receive the benefit of exemption from execution without any
other associated consequences. As such, Justice Scalia’s concern
was that this could incentivize capital defendants who are not
truly intellectually disabled from faking symptoms in the hope of
being exempted from execution.
Though these concerns have some legitimacy on their
face, the institution of a countrywide evaluation scheme for
capital defendants claiming to suffer from intellectual disability
could readily resolve these issues. While a defendant could
potentially “fake” the symptoms of intellectual disability during
a one-time evaluation (or perhaps even intentionally perform
poorly on an IQ examination), it is nearly impossible for a
defendant to fake historical documentation such as school
records or interviews with teachers. Justice Scalia’s concerns
are valid in an evaluation regime that focuses solely on the
results of IQ testing—particularly regimes that focus on the
results of one test and ignore other previous testing results.
But a more thorough and holistic evaluation procedure would
certainly ease these concerns and ensure both that those who
are not intellectually disabled do not derive an unjust “benefit”
and also that those who do suffer from intellectual disability
are not wrongly executed. As discussed below, however, states
have still failed to adopt such a holistic review process.
B.

The Impact of Atkins and Changes to State Death
Penalty Statutes

In the wake of Atkins, states were left with the prospect
of reformulating their death penalty statutes to comply with
the Supreme Court’s ruling but were given little guidance by
the Court on how to do so. While the states successfully adapted
their statutes to include a method for evaluating a capital
defendant’s potential intellectual disability, inherent in doing
so was the risk that some defendants suffering from intellectual
disability might still be executed.

99

Id.
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One example of this risk manifested in the case of
Marvin Lee Wilson. Wilson was sentenced to death after being
found guilty of murdering a police informant in Texas in the
early 1990s.100 Wilson remained on death row after the Court’s
2002 decision in Atkins, and he petitioned the Texas courts to
reverse his death sentence because of his intellectual disability.101
In the wake of the Court’s decision in Atkins, Texas created a
standard by which to evaluate capital defendants who claimed to
suffer from intellectual disability and thus that they were exempt
from the death penalty under Atkins.102
While many states took into account the clinical and
scientific approaches recommended by professional organizations
such as the AAIDD and the APA, Texas based its evaluative
factors on a literary character—specifically, Lennie from John
Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men.103 These factors, known as the
“Briseño factors” (named for the Texas court case in which they
were developed), focus on social skills and do not take into
account clinical evaluative techniques.104 The factors specifically
focus on “whether the defendant can formulate and carry out plans,
display leadership, effectively lie or hide facts to protect the
person’s self-interest, and respond appropriately and coherently.”105
In the case of Marvin Lee Wilson, the Texas court noted
that because Wilson was married, had a child, and lied to the
police to protect himself, he was not intellectually disabled
under the Briseño factors and therefore was not immune from
the death penalty.106 Texas found Wilson not intellectually
disabled despite Wilson’s regular IQ scores of 61, testimony
from family and friends that his behavior was consistent with
intellectual disability, and a diagnosis of intellectual disability
by a neuropsychologist during Wilson’s appeal.107 In this
evaluation, the neuropsychologist found Wilson unable to dress
himself in matching socks or button his shirt.108 The Texas
See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
Id.
102 Andrew Cohen, Of Mice and Men: The Execution of Marvin Wilson, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/08/of-mice-an
d-men-the-execution-of-marvin-wilson/260713/ [http://perma.cc/AB7L-84MJ]; Ex parte
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
103 Ed Pilkington, Texas Set to Execute Death Row Inmate Diagnosed as
‘Mentally Retarded,’ THEGUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2012, 10:43 EDT), http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2012/aug/05/texas-death-row-mentally-retarded [http://perma.cc/E7RU-H6FL].
104 US/Texas: Halt Execution of Man with Intellectual Disabilities, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/07/ustexas-halt-executionman-intellectual-disabilities [http://perma.cc/3JEF-MG6G].
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.; Pilkington, supra note 103.
108 Pilkington, supra note 103.
100

101
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Supreme Court upheld Wilson’s sentence, and the U.S. Supreme
Court declined to grant certiorari.109 Wilson was executed on
August 7, 2012.110
The Briseño factors have been criticized throughout the
country. The AAIDD stated that the factors “are based on false
stereotypes . . . that effectively exclude all but the most severely
incapacitated.”111 Numerous news articles covering Wilson’s
appeal questioned the legitimacy of using factors based on a
literary character when a person’s life hung in the balance.112
John Steinbeck’s son, Thomas Steinbeck, spoke with disbelief
upon learning that his father’s work was being used in such a
way.113 Mr. Steinbeck publicly stated, “I had no idea that the
great state of Texas would use a fictional character that my
father created to make a point about human loyalty and
dedication . . . as a benchmark to identify whether defendants
with intellectual disability should live or die.”114 Partially in
response to the backlash surrounding the Briseño factors in the
wake of Wilson’s execution, in 2013, Texas State Senator
Rodney Ellis proposed Senate Bill 750, which established new
factors (based on the definition of intellectual disability from the
AAIDD) to evaluate a capital defendant for intellectual
disability.115 This new standard would also require an IQ score of
75 or below to exempt a capital defendant from execution.116 As of
mid-2016, the Texas legislature is still considering the bill.117
Since Atkins, other states have taken a more scientific
approach to defining intellectual disability, employing both IQ
testing and other evaluative measures. Kentucky defines
intellectual disability as “significant subaverage intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with substantial deficits in
adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental
period.”118 The Kentucky statute defines “[s]ignificantly subaverage
109 Texas Executes Marvin Wilson, supra note 3; Wilson v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct.
81 (2012) (mem.).
110 Id.
111 Pilkington, supra note 103 (quoting AAIDD amicus brief in a different case).
112 See, e.g., id.; Rudolf, supra note 6; Texas Executes Marvin Wilson, supra
note 3.
113 Rudolf, supra note 6.
114 Id. (alteration in original).
115 Brandi Grissom, Bill Would Limit Execution of Intellectually Disabled,
TEXAS TRIBUNE (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2013/03/06/bill-wouldlimit-execution-intellectually-disabled/ [http://perma.cc/8Q8E-SDVU]; 83(R) Bill Stages
for SB 750, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/
history.aspx?LegSess=83R&Bill=SB750 [http://perma.cc/WA7B-UYWW] (last visited
June 21, 2016); S.B. 750, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013).
116 Grissom, supra note 115.
117 83(R) Bill Stages for SB 750, supra note 115.
118 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (West 2016).

1698

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:4

general intellectual function[]” as an IQ score “of seventy (70) or
below.”119 Tennessee uses IQ scores, but only in conjunction with
deficits in adaptive behavior that manifested before the age of
18.120 Arkansas does not employ a strict IQ score cutoff, but
instead provides that a score of 65 or lower on an IQ test is a
“rebuttable presumption of mental retardation.”121 Washington’s
statute defines intellectual disability as “[s]ignificantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning . . . existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior” where “both significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning and deficits in
adaptive behavior were manifested during the developmental
period.”122 Washington’s definition of intellectual disability could
be interpreted to require either a specific IQ score before
evaluating a defendant’s adaptive behavior or that the score be
used in conjunction with consideration of the adaptive deficits. It
is not entirely clear from a plain reading of Washington’s statute
whether an IQ score is a hurdle there as it is in other states.
Given these varying standards for defining intellectual
disability, there is the potential for wildly inconsistent
determinations of mental ability in capital cases. In Hall v.
Florida, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to adopt a
uniform standard that would guide states in determining what
constituted an intellectual disability for death penalty purposes.
Unfortunately, the Court’s decision still leaves this area of the law
in disarray. The next part analyzes Hall in detail.
III.

HALL V. FLORIDA—AN OPPORTUNITY FOR UNIFORMITY IN
EVALUATIONS, WASTED

A.

Procedural History

The State of Florida sentenced Freddie Lee Hall to
death for his role in the kidnapping, beating, rape, and murder
of Karol Hurst and the murder of Lonnie Coburn, a sheriff’s
deputy.123 When Hall was first sentenced, the Supreme Court
had not yet made its decision in Atkins categorically excluding
the intellectually disabled from execution.124 Additionally, at
the time of Hall’s first sentencing, Florida did not take
intellectual disability into account at all during sentencing
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2016).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (2015).
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2015).
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
Id.; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002).
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proceedings—not even as a mitigating factor.125 But by the time
of Hall’s second sentencing, he was allowed to present evidence
regarding his disability because Florida began considering
intellectual disability as a mitigating factor per the Court’s
decision in Hitchcock.126 During this second sentencing, Hall
presented extensive evidence regarding his intellectual
disability—which included school records, notes from former
teachers who identified him as “[m]entally retarded,” and
testimony from his lawyer from a prior criminal trial who noted
that Hall functioned “at best comparable to [his] 4-year-old
daughter.”127 Hall also presented evidence from medical clinicians
who stated that he was “significantly retarded” in their medical
opinion.128 Hall’s siblings testified that their mother was not
sympathetic to Hall’s developmental struggles and regularly beat
Hall for being “slow” or making simple mistakes.129
Despite this wide sampling of evidence, the jury sentenced
Hall to death.130 Though acknowledging that there was
“substantial evidence in the record” to support the finding that
“Freddie Lee Hall has been mentally retarded his entire life,” the
sentencing court felt that the medical professionals who testified
on Hall’s behalf may have exaggerated, as their testimony could
not comport with the evidence that Hall had formulated a plan to
steal a car, rob a convenience store, and murder two people.131 The
sentencing court went even further, stating that even if the
medical professionals’ testimony was entirely accurate, the
presence of intellectual disability “cannot be used to justify,
excuse or extenuate the moral culpability of the defendant in this
cause.”132 The Florida Supreme Court upheld Hall’s sentence,
stating, “Hall’s argument that his mental retardation provided a
pretense of moral or legal justification had no merit.”133
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins categorically
excluded those suffering from intellectual disability from
execution, Hall filed a motion claiming that his intellectual
disability, according to Atkins, prevented him from being
Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986.
Id. at 1990-91 (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987)
(discussing the import of allowing juries at capital sentencing to consider all mitigating
factors, such as testimonial evidence about a tumultuous upbringing, and not only
those articulated in the state death penalty statute)); see supra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text.
127 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990-91.
128 Id. at 1991.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. (quoting App. at 46).
132 Id. (quoting App. at 56).
133 Id. (quoting Hall v. Florida, 614 So.2d 473, 478 (Fla. 1993)).
125
126
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executed.134 During a court-ordered hearing to evaluate Hall’s
intellectual ability, Hall presented evidence of his disability,
including his IQ scores.135 While Hall had a myriad of IQ testing
over the years with scores ranging between 60 and 80, the trial
court excluded Hall’s scores below 70 for evidentiary reasons.136
As Florida’s statute required an IQ score below 70 as a threshold
qualification to be evaluated for intellectual disability, Hall was
prevented from presenting any other evidence about his
intellectual disability, and Hall’s appeal was rejected.137
B.

Majority Opinion

In granting certiorari, the Court considered not whether
a person who is intellectually disabled could be executed (as
those suffering from intellectual disability were already
categorically excluded from execution in Atkins), but whether
Florida’s statute sufficiently identified those suffering from
intellectual disability to appropriately exclude them from
execution.138 The Court noted again the reasons why those
suffering from intellectual disabilities are categorically excluded
from the death penalty: because “[n]o legitimate penological
purpose is served by executing” those suffering from intellectual
disability, and because those suffering from intellectual disability
“face a ‘special risk of wrongful execution.’”139 The Court picked up
where it left off in Atkins, determining whether or not state
efforts in defining intellectual disability as required by Atkins
had been successful.140
The Court looked to medical experts’ work to determine
what might constitute an appropriate definition of intellectual
disability.141 The Court returned to the general definition of
intellectual disability that it relied on in Atkins: “significantly
subaverage intellectual functions, deficits in adaptive functioning
(the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing
circumstances), and the onset of these deficits during the

Id. at 1991-92.
Id. at 1992.
136 Id. The trial court did not admit a report completed by Dr. Mosman, the
psychiatrist whose testing of Hall resulted in a score of 60, because Dr. Mosman was
deceased at the time of trial and therefore could not testify to corroborate his report,
which the court found lacked important details about how the score was obtained. Hall
v. State, 109 So.3d 704, 707, 710 (Fla. 2012).
137 Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986.
138 Id. at 1993.
139 Id. at 1992-93.
140 Id. at 1993 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)).
141 Id.
134

135
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developmental period.”142 On its face, the Florida statute appeared
to be in line with these factors—using IQ testing as one factor to
evaluate a defendant’s potential intellectual disability without
precluding other evidence.143 The statute as interpreted by the
Florida Supreme Court, however, prevented courts from taking
into account other evidence that demonstrated potential
intellectual disability.144 Even more concerning, the Florida courts
did not take into account an IQ test’s standard error of
measurement (SEM), which describes the reliability of the test.145
In failing to account for the SEM, the Florida courts were risking
reliance on scores that could be an inaccurate representation of a
defendant’s true level of intellectual functioning.146
The SEM supports the concept that intellectual
functioning cannot be limited to a single numerical score.147
When an individual takes an IQ test and receives a score, that
individual’s intellectual functioning is actually understood to
exist within the range of scores around the numerical score
they receive.148 Put simply, if an individual scores a 70 on an IQ
test, the “actual” score on the test is the range of scores from 65
to 75.149 For an individual who scores a 70 on any one IQ test,
the risk that a person who indeed has intellectual functioning
below the score of 70 (as the “actual” range of scores falls both
below and above 70) would be categorically prevented from
presenting further evidence of disability is deeply concerning.
Refusal to consider the SEM of IQ scores creates an
unacceptable risk that those who do suffer from intellectual
functioning will be executed.150 Indeed, in Atkins, none of the
state statutes the Court considered had a bright-line IQ score
cutoff without also factoring in the SEM of the scores.151 This
risk does not even take into account other potential factors that
influence IQ testing scores, including flaws in the actual test
and administration errors.152
Id. at 1994 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308).
Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1994-95.
146 Id. at 1995.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, 25, Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986
(2014) (No. 12-10882).
151 Id. at 6, 9, 25; see generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314 (2002)
(discussing the number of states that passed legislation exempting the intellectually
disabled from execution in the years since the Court declined to create such a
categorical exclusion in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
152 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1995.
142

143
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This exclusive reliance on a bright-line IQ score cutoff
without consideration of the score’s SEM is exactly what was
happening in Florida, and indeed it is exactly what happened in
the case of Freddie Lee Hall. Despite research and information
from the psychological community that stated that evaluating a
person’s intellectual disability requires examining a number of
factors, the Florida Supreme Court used the test as a fixed
score, creating an unnecessary risk that individuals suffering
from intellectual disability (including Hall) would be executed.153
While the Court in Hall spent a significant portion of its
analysis evaluating the scientific concerns regarding the use of
a bright-line score requirement, it later turned to a lengthier
analysis of whether there was a consensus among the states that
using a strict IQ test score cutoff is not compatible with evolving
American societal standards of decency.154 The Court noted that
only Kentucky and Virginia had adopted a bright-line IQ score
cutoff akin to Florida’s.155 Additionally, the statutes in Arizona,
Delaware, Kansas, North Carolina, and Washington could be
interpreted to impose a strict IQ score cutoff, but each had
some safeguards that seemed to prevent the risks associated
with such cutoffs.156 For example, Arizona had taken the
margin of error of the test administered into account and
required a hearing for any defendant who scored a 70 or below
on any one IQ test.157 Arizona also recommended the use of
scores from multiple tests as another method to avoid the risks
associated with ignoring the margin of error implicit in IQ
testing.158 Kansas, Delaware, and Washington had executed a
collective total of four individuals in the decade prior to Hall, and
the Court found these cases unpersuasive because none of the
defendants raised intellectual disability as a defense or
mitigating factor.159
The Court observed that in addition to only nine states
employing a strict IQ score cutoff, another factor that it needed
to consider was the “[c]onsistency of the direction of change” in
the other states.160 Following Atkins, Connecticut, Illinois,
Maryland, New Jersey, and New Mexico all abolished the death
penalty, and New York’s statute was invalidated by its Court of
Id.
Id. at 1996-98.
155 Id. at 1996.
156 Id.
157 Id.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(K)(3), (5) (2011).
158 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1996; State v. Roque, 141 P.3d 368, 403 (Ariz. 2006);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(F) (2016).
159 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1997.
160 Id.
153
154
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Appeals.161 And the vast majority of states that still employ the
death penalty allow defendants to present additional evidence of
intellectual disability, regardless of their IQ score.162 The Court
concluded that examining this state-to-state evidence and the
professional information regarding the accuracy of IQ testing
supported the finding that there is a societal consensus against
bright-line IQ score cutoffs in evaluating intellectual disability.163
The Court acknowledged that it did not give states a
procedure for evaluating whether the Eighth Amendment, as
interpreted in Atkins, protects a person’s specific level of
intellectual disability.164 The Court found that despite allowing
states to create individual metrics by which to evaluate intellectual
disability, this “did not give the States unfettered discretion to
define the full scope of the constitutional protection.”165 Indeed, the
Court made it seem as though it should have been practically
obvious to states that the use of a strict IQ score cutoff would
be unacceptable under Atkins. The Court specifically stated,
“Atkins itself not only cited clinical definitions for intellectual
disability but also noted that the States’ standards, on which
the Court based its own conclusion, conformed to those
definitions.”166 The Court went even further and stated that the
clinical definitions of intellectual disability (which state that IQ
scores represent a range of scores and should not be employed
as a fixed number) were a “fundamental premise” of the Atkins
decision.167 Despite seemingly giving the states full purview to
establish a standard by which to evaluate intellectual ability in
Atkins, the Court clarified that this deference was in fact
limited. Specifically, “[i]f the States were to have complete
autonomy to define intellectual disability as they wished, the
Court’s decision in Atkins could become a nullity, and the
Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not
become a reality.”168 Because the Florida statute’s strict cutoff
161 Id.; State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2015); Joe Sutton, Maryland
Governor Signs Death Penalty Repeal, CNN (May 2, 2013, 2:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/05/02/us/maryland-death-penalty/ [http://perma.cc/5FTC-NHKB]; Jeremy W. Peters,
Death Penalty Repealed in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/Q6SK-MDE6]; Associated
Press, Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/03/19/us/19execute.html [http://perma.cc/8UPY-5XPN]; People v. LaValle,
3 N.Y.3d 88, 129-31 (N.Y. 2004).
162 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1997-98.
163 Id. at 1998.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1999.
167 Id.
168 Id.
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score went against the principles of Atkins, the Court held
that it was unconstitutional.169
The Court in Hall also granted a great deal of deference
to the conclusions of medical professionals and the greater
medical community. In particular, the Court gave significant
credit to the amicus brief submitted on Hall’s behalf by the
American Psychiatric Association.170 The APA stated that
Florida’s strict IQ cutoff of 70 contradicted professional
consensus about how to properly diagnose intellectual
disability.171 In fact, the Court specifically noted that neither
Florida nor its amici had cited a single medical professional
who found a strict IQ score cutoff to be an acceptable method of
evaluating intellectual disability in his or her professional
opinion.172 Indeed, the Court stated that “[i]ntellectual disability
is a condition, not a number.”173 The Court closed with the
reflection that while the “[s]tates are laboratories for
experimentation, . . . those experiments may not deny the basic
dignity the Constitution protects.”174 Despite this concern, the
Court again failed to offer a method for evaluating capital
defendants for intellectual disability that would protect these
most basic constitutional dignities, instead offering only advice
on what not to do.
C.

Dissent

In his dissent, Justice Alito expressed particular
concern that the majority had created a framework that was
“both conceptually unsound and likely to result in confusion.”175
Deeply entwined throughout Justice Alito’s dissent is a concern
that the majority stepped away from evolving standards of
societal decency.176 Justice Alito noted that one of the primary
reasons that the Court in Atkins refrained from instituting a
procedure for states to follow in determining if a defendant is
“sufficiently” intellectually disabled to be exempt from capital
punishment is because there was no consensus among the
states as to what procedure to follow.177 Atkins, according to

169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Id. at 2000.
Id. at 2000-01.
Id. at 2001.
Id. at 2000.
Id. at 2001 (citing DSM-5, supra note 22, at 37).
Id. at 2001.
Id. at 2002 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2003.
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Justice Alito, does not bar a bright-line score cutoff.178 Indeed,
he observed that in writing the Atkins decision, the Court
specifically stated that the professional consensus of what
methods to use in evaluating capital defendants were “by no
means dispositive.”179 Justice Alito contended that still no
consensus exists, and he noted specifically that even Hall in his
petition to the Court acknowledged that there is no uniformity
among the states. Rather, Hall argued, “the precise number of
States that share Florida’s approach is immaterial.”180
Justice Alito went on to conclude that the majority’s
analysis of current state statutes was both “aggressive” and
“deeply flawed.”181 The majority recognized that many states do
require consideration of the SEM, but Justice Alito argued that
not only is there disagreement among the states about whether
the SEM should be considered, but even among the states that
do consider the SEM, there is no consensus on how exactly to
evaluate the measurement.182 According to Justice Alito, the
majority attempted to make up for its inability to find state
consensus by relying on the opinions of professional
organizations that have no place in examining how or if
societal standards of decency have evolved.183 Professional
organizations often change their opinions and retract earlier
opinions in light of new research.184 In relying on such opinions,
Justice Alito accused the majority of opening the floodgates to
further litigation and creating great uncertainty for the states.185
Justice Alito also did not entirely disagree with the
majority’s belief that Florida should have allowed Hall to
introduce evidence of his diminished intellectual abilities beyond
his score on standardized IQ testing. Instead, the Court required
that a capital defendant, if scoring any lower than a 75 on any
IQ test, must be permitted to submit evidence about his or her
diminished adaptive abilities.186 The dissent found that there
must be a distinction between determining what a defendant’s
adaptive abilities are and what his intellectual functioning is,
and that determining what adaptive functioning deficiencies a
defendant has does not impact whether or not he should be
See id. at 2005.
Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002)).
180 Id. at 2003 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Hall v. Florida, 134 S.
Ct. 1986 (2014) (No. 12-10882)).
181 Id. at 2003-04.
182 Id. at 2004.
183 Id. at 2005.
184 Id. at 2006.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 2008.
178
179
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exempted from death.187 It is intellectual functioning, not
adaptive abilities, that affects an individual’s capacity to be
culpable for his actions, and therefore only those defendants
whose intellectual functioning is deficient should be exempted
from execution, according to Justice Alito.188
The dissent was also concerned that the Court, and in
turn, the states, had oversimplified the concept of taking SEM
into account in considering IQ scores.189 Justice Alito expressed
great trepidation that the majority’s oversimplification would
not only confuse states, but would also overcomplicate the
process of evaluating intelligence—as it appears that
defendants would now need to introduce evidence regarding
the accuracy of each and every test they have taken throughout
their lives.190 As a result of these concerns, the dissent would
have both upheld Hall’s sentence and the Florida statute
without examining additional evidence supporting Hall’s
intellectual disability.191 The dissent’s concerns could have been
remedied had the majority suggested a methodology for all
states to follow in evaluating capital defendants.
IV.

PROPOSED STANDARDIZED SCHEME FOR EVALUATING
CAPITAL DEFENDANTS’ COGNITIVE ABILITIES

To ensure that those capital defendants who truly suffer
from intellectual disability are exempted from the death
penalty, there must be a uniform method of evaluation. By
allowing states to create varying methods of evaluation, the
Supreme Court has fostered an environment in which capital
defendants who should be categorically exempted from
execution are precluded from presenting evidence to support
the same categorical exemption. While realistic federalism
concerns might find a countrywide evaluation scheme to be
federal government overreach, the period between the Court’s
decisions in Atkins and Hall demonstrates that allowing states to
create individualized evaluation schemes results in unequal
exemption for capital defendants who are similarly intellectually
disabled.192 Ensuring that intellectually disabled defendants have

Id.
Id. at 2009.
189 Id. at 2011-12.
190 Id. at 2010-11.
191 Id. at 2012.
192 See, e.g., Inmate Removed from Death Row, ABC11 (Feb. 2, 2012, 8:41 AM),
http://abc11.com/archive/8528653 [http://perma.cc/3X76-AD86] (showing a recent
application of Atkins to remove an inmate from death row); Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d
187
188
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the opportunity to present the entire spectrum of evidence
regarding their intellectual disability will protect defendants
from enduring punishment that is not only cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment, but also irreversible.
This is not to say that states should be barred from
considering the results of IQ testing entirely in evaluating a
defendant’s intellectual disability. The usefulness of IQ testing
is not to be discounted. To accurately and effectively employ the
results of IQ testing, however, states must take into account the
SEM.193 Further, a state cannot rely on IQ testing results alone.
Instead, a holistic evaluation, which includes allowing a capital
defendant to present other information regarding his or her
intellectual disability, even if that defendant’s IQ testing puts
them outside what is considered to be the range of IQ scores
that constitute intellectual disability, will ensure that all
capital defendants’ intellectual abilities are properly evaluated.
These additional evaluative components are especially
important in diagnosing intellectual disability, as IQ tests
cannot gauge all components of a person’s intelligence. In
particular, IQ testing does not evaluate a person’s practical
intelligence—things like a person self-identifying as an audial
learner and as a result asking more questions in a classroom
setting to foster the personal learning experience.194 Such
practical intelligence considerations are especially important
factors when evaluating whether an individual is potentially
intellectually disabled, because the DSM-5 defines intellectual
disability as characterized by significant limitations in both
intellectual functioning and adaptive behaviors (such as these
“practical intelligence” considerations).195
In evaluating whether a defendant is intellectually
disabled—meaning that a defendant has significant limitations
both in intellectual functioning and adaptive behaviors that
manifested before age 18—states need to consider factors that fall
613, 620-21 (Ga. 2003) (requiring defendants to prove intellectual disability “beyond a
reasonable doubt”).
193 Ollie J. Seay, Evaluating Mental Retardation for Forensic Purposes, 2
APPLIED PSYCHOL. CRIM. JUST. 52, 54-55 (2006).
194 Jacque Wilson, What Your IQ Score Doesn’t Tell You, CNN (Feb. 19, 2014,
8:59 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/19/health/iq-score-meaning/ [http://perma.cc/79
NY-XFYC]; see Practical Thinking: Examples & Quiz, STUDY.COM, http://study.com/
academy/lesson/practical-thinking-definition-examples-quiz.html [http://perma.cc/3FB
W-EY96] (last visited June 21, 2016).
195 Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N. OF INTELLECTUAL AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#.VFVt1
NR4qfw [http://perma.cc/VPW7-WCNM] (last visited May 20, 2016); AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 31 (5th ed. 2013).
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into three general categories: conceptual, social, and practical.196 A
system of assessment that looks at a defendant’s abilities using
this spectrum of factors will enable states to properly identify
which capital defendants are indeed intellectually disabled.
Evidence should not be excluded solely based on the score on a
test, the purpose of which is not to determine who is and who is
not intellectually disabled.197 That is why this proposed system
of evaluation does not exclude the consideration of IQ testing
scores; it simply precludes using IQ scores as the sole method
of intellectual evaluation. As Justice Kagan noted in oral
argument for Hall v. Florida, “[An IQ test score] is a tool to
decide whether someone is mentally retarded, and it’s a tool
that functions in one prong of a three prong test.”198 Such a tool
is invaluable in evaluating intellectual ability, but it cannot be
used in a way that stifles other crucial evaluative methods.
A.

Conceptual Factors

Under the proposed evaluative scheme, a capital
defendant pursuing an exemption from capital punishment
based on an alleged intellectual disability must first establish
that he has diminished intellectual ability within a spectrum of
conceptual factors. Conceptual factors are those that more
concretely anchor a defendant’s intellectual abilities in hard
numbers, without taking into account the specific characteristics
of any one defendant. Included in this evaluative prong would be
the results of any IQ testing, as well as the defendant’s formal
educational history and performance. Even if the evidence
presented during this phase of evaluation does not support a
diagnosis of intellectual disability, a defendant would still be
allowed to present further evidence of (and be evaluated for
performance under) the remaining two factors (i.e., social and
practical).
1. IQ Tests
It is not disputed that the accepted range of IQ testing
scores that constitutes below average intellectual functioning is
between 70 and 75.199 Just because a particular person scores
slightly outside the 75 maximum score, however, does not mean
Id.
Wilson, supra note 194.
198 Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014)
(No. 12-10882).
199 See Seay, supra note 193, at 71.
196
197
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that he or she definitely does not suffer from diminished
intellectual functioning. The mean score of Americans with
average intellectual functioning on standard IQ tests falls
within the range of 85-115.200 Standard IQ tests are scored with
the average score being 100 (with the highest and lowest scores
being above 200 and below 60, respectively),201 with a standard
deviation of 15, maintaining scores to a normal distribution
curve.202 In evaluating IQ test scores, one also needs to take
into account the standard error of measurement implicit in all
IQ tests.203 The SEM evaluates if a specific test were repeated
independently a number of times, how reliably the test would
measure any one person’s score.204 The creator of the test
identifies the SEM of any particular test.
The need to take SEM into account is especially prevalent
in the present system of evaluating a defendant’s potential
intellectual disability, as many states (including Florida in the
case of Freddie Lee Hall) allow one score above the range of 7075 to preclude a defendant from presenting further information
about his or her potential intellectual disability.205 Under this
note’s proposed holistic evaluative system, which would require
courts to consider all evidence of a defendant’s disability, the
concern over failing to consider the SEM of a particular test in
evaluating a defendant’s scores is somewhat quelled. In using
IQ testing as a portion of this new evaluative system, however,
the SEM inherent in the test still cannot be ignored.
In addition to considering the test’s SEM, the court
must also evaluate all IQ scores a defendant has received.
Selective score consideration is another problem present in the
post-Atkins evaluative scheme, putting intellectually disabled
capital defendants at further risk. For example, in the case of
Marvin Lee Wilson, the Texas court refused to consider his
multiple IQ scores of 61, which demonstrated that he fell below
Texas’s maximum score requirement of 70.206 By considering both

200 Kendra Cherry, What Is the Average IQ?, ABOUT HEALTH, http://psychology.a
bout.com/od/intelligence/f/average-iq.htm [http://perma.cc/9SB8-GM4C] (last updated June
7, 2016).
201 Top 12 People with the Highest IQ Scores in the World, LISTOVATIVE, http://
listovative.com/top-12-people-highest-iq-world/ [http://perma.cc/6PFN-R4R6] (last visited
June 21, 2016).
202 Cherry, supra note 200.
203 Seay, supra note 193, at 54-55.
204 Id.
205 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2011-12 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting).
206 Pilkington, supra note 103; Wilson v. Quarterman, 2009 WL 900807, at *78 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (unpublished), aff’d sub nom. Wilson v. Thaler, 450 Fed. App’x. 369
(5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); Amicus Curiae Brief of American Association on
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the SEM inherent in the test itself and the entirety of the
defendant’s testing history, states will be able to use IQ testing
as the evaluative tool it is designed to be, instead of treating it
as a diagnostic tool it never was and never will be.
2. Educational History
In addition to looking at the results of IQ testing, courts
must also consider a defendant’s educational history. While IQ
testing can demonstrate a person’s internal abilities, educational
history demonstrates what a particular person was actually able
to achieve conceptually. In evaluating educational history, a
court will consider such factors as highest level of education
achieved, whether the defendant received any special classification
(e.g., placement in special education classes), and the defendant’s
performance in that education (e.g., grades throughout primary
and secondary school). Beyond looking at raw data, courts
should also consider more defendant-specific factors where
available. For example, evaluative reports from a defendant’s
former teacher could provide extensive insight into a
defendant’s conceptual abilities. Studies have shown that those
students who frequently act out in the academic setting also
frequently suffer from some sort of educational disability (e.g.,
dyslexia, anxiety, dysgraphia).207 If a particular defendant, in
addition to poor performance in school, has frequent
disciplinary citations or poor commentary on progress reports
from teachers, this could support that the defendant suffered
from an undiagnosed intellectual disability.
B.

Social Factors

In addition to examining conceptual factors (those factors
most commonly associated by laypersons with a diagnosis of
intellectual disability), a court must also evaluate certain social
factors associated with the defendant. Beyond having diminished
“traditional” cognitive abilities (i.e., those abilities the population
at large generally associates with intelligence), people with
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities in Support of Petitioner at 23-24, Wilson v.
Thaler, 450 Fed. App’x 369 ( 5th Cir. 2011).
207 Caroline Miller, How Anxiety Leads to Disruptive Behavior, CHILD MIND
INST., http://www.childmind.org/en/posts/articles/2013-3-26-anxiety-and-disruptive-behavior
[http://perma.cc/Y7WQ-H4VD] (last visited June 21, 2016); Richard Dowson, Dyslexia—The
Least Known, Most Common Learning Disability, ALBERTA TCHRS.’ ASS’N, http://www.te
achers.ab.ca/Publications/ATA%20Magazine/Volume%2084/Number%201/Articles/Pages/
Dyslexia%20The%20Least%20Known%20Most%20Common%20Learning%20Disability.a
spx [http://perma.cc/3ARK-7SB9] (last visited June 21, 2016).
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intellectual disabilities also tend to have certain diminished
social abilities.208 No two individuals with intellectual disabilities
are the same, and while one person’s intellectual disability might
manifest in the form of extreme conceptual deficiencies but
high social functioning, another person could have closer to
average conceptual functioning but extremely deficient social
functioning. Social functioning is categorically defined as an
individual’s ability to work and interact with other individuals,
most broadly understood as a person’s interpersonal skills. It is
this unique quality of intellectual disability that necessitates a
holistic evaluative approach and demonstrates why a system
rooted exclusively in IQ testing is doomed to fail.
The primary diagnostic tool available to determine
whether a defendant has diminished social abilities is to
conduct interviews with both the defendant and those people
who knew him growing up. It is particularly important to get a
full history, as one of the diagnostic requirements of intellectual
disability is that its onset was before age 18.209 There is some
concern, particularly among those who have written specifically
on diagnosing criminal offenders with intellectual disability,
about this age-of-onset requirement. Many of those individuals
currently incarcerated in the United States come from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds.210 As a result, many of these
offenders are not likely to have been evaluated for the presence of
intellectual disability as they grew up, making it difficult to
prove that their symptoms began before the age of 18.211 In
evaluating such defendants, the courts should allow a margin
of discretion.
Parents, loved ones, friends, former teachers, and others
who knew the defendant can discuss the defendant’s social
abilities at different developmental phases. These participants
in the defendant’s upbringing can discuss exactly when the
defendant appeared to struggle with conceptual issues—for
example, that he developed the ability to read much later than his
friends or siblings—and can also comment more specifically on
the presence of social deficits (e.g., he struggled to make friends as

Seay, supra note 193, at 52-53.
Definition of Intellectual Disability, supra note 16.
210 Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 311, 345 (1997).
211 See, e.g., Steven J. Mulroy, Execution by Accident: Evidentiary and
Constitutional Problems with the “Childhood Onset” Requirement in Atkins Claims, 37 VT.
L. REV. 591, 593 (2013) (discussing capital defendant who grew up in war-torn
Vietnam and as a result had no information about age of onset of intellectual
disability characteristics).
208

209
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a younger child or had difficulty remaining independent from the
influence of strong personalities).
Another important trait that can be gleaned from these
interviews is whether the defendant was easily influenced by
others. In many of the cases involving intellectually disabled
defendants, the defendant did not act alone—and oftentimes
faced the death penalty because of testimony from an alleged
accomplice incriminating the defendant as the mastermind.212
Courts have often found that this supports the argument that
the defendant is not intellectually disabled (as the defendant
was able to develop and execute a crime), when in reality such
facts can support a defendant’s diminished social capacity to
say “no” to a dominating accomplice.
In evaluating the defendant on this spectrum, it is also
crucial to interview the defendant himself. A psychological
professional should conduct this interview, since diagnosing
intellectual disability is not always a simple task. This is especially
true in the context of interviewing criminal offenders who, while
traditionally depicted as closed off emotionally, tend to have
extreme emotional ranges, particularly in relation to their
crimes.213 A psychological professional, in addition to being
trained generally in conducting evaluative interviews, will also
be able to interpret the undercurrent of a defendant’s answers
by drawing out evidence of a potential intellectual disability
beyond just the words contained in an answer. While there is
likely to be concern over such an evaluation’s cost (particularly
the employment of a psychological professional), the costs
associated with executing a death row inmate far outweigh
those associated with conducting a thorough evaluation.214
Indeed, ensuring that capital defendants with intellectual
disabilities are not improperly executed will allow the reallocation
of funds to conduct proper evaluations of potentially intellectually
disabled defendants.
C.

Practical Factors

In addition to evaluating a defendant’s conceptual and
social factors, the court must finally look to evidence regarding
212 See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 307-08 (2002).
213 C. Frazier & T. Meisenhelder, Exploratory Notes on Criminality and
Emotional Ambivalence, 8 QUALITATIVE SOC. 266 (1995).
214 Kelly Phillips Erb, Considering the Death Penalty: Your Tax Dollars at
Work, FORBES (May 1, 2014, 12:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/20
14/05/01/considering-the-death-penalty-your-tax-dollars-at-work/ [http://perma.cc/F8A
N-UP4U].
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a defendant’s abilities within the realm of certain practical
factors. Practical factors can be categorically defined as those
factors that influence a defendant’s ability to function in dayto-day life, outside of any formal academic or intellectual
performance. These factors are those most likely to be overlooked
in a standard judicial evaluation and also the ones least likely to
be interpreted correctly. Under the post-Atkins evaluative
system (and a sentiment that certain Justices maintained in
Hall), many judges have expressed that a defendant cannot
truly be intellectually disabled if he was able to commit the
offense for which he is charged. Just because a person was
capable of performing the actions required to constitute the
crime, however, does not mean that person developed an
elaborate plan to commit that crime. For example, in the case of
Daryl Atkins, the crime involved a spur-of-the-moment decision—
Atkins and his accomplice William Jones happened upon Eric
Nesbitt outside a convenience store, abducted Nesbitt, took the
money from his person, and later killed him.215
The realm of practical skills encompasses such things as
a defendant’s work history, including the types of jobs he has
held, the length of time he was employed in any given position,
and any employment evaluations that might be available. On
the opposite end of the practical skills spectrum are such skills
as the ability to tie one’s own shoes, dress oneself, and prepare
basic meals. Another important component of the practical
skills evaluation is basic money management. While an inability
to effectively manage money is not alone a sign of intellectual
disability, this combined with lowered conceptual and social skills
(or even skills under those umbrellas of evaluation that are
somewhat deficient) supports a diagnosis of intellectual disability.
In looking at a defendant’s conceptual, social, and
practical abilities, a trained psychological professional can make
an educated determination and diagnosis of whether a defendant
suffers from intellectual disability and thus requires an
exemption from the death penalty under Atkins and Hall. This
holistic review is more accurate than placing someone’s life in
the balance based solely on a numerical scale. While it will
admittedly take more time to evaluate defendants under this
framework, Justice Breyer put this concern in perspective during
the oral argument for Hall.
Justice Breyer: . . . When [the IQ score is] there at 70, [the Defense]
call[s] their expert, who informs the decision maker just what I said
[i.e., other factors related to the defendant’s intellectual abilities].
215

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
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Now, that would take a little time, maybe 15 minutes, maybe a little
longer. But that’s what [the states] want to do, I think. And—and
why not? I mean, what is so terrible about doing it?
Mr. Winsor: What is so terrible about doing it is you would end up
increasing the proportion of people, the number of people who would
be eligible for a mental retardation finding.
Justice Breyer: But only those who in fact are mentally retarded.216

CONCLUSION
The U.S. Constitution protects numerous fundamental
freedoms—those of free speech, security in one’s personal effects,
and freedom of religious association. Deeply rooted in American
principles and values of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
is the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual
punishment. Despite arguments on both sides regarding the
inherent cruelty of a “life for a life,” the Supreme Court maintains
that the death penalty does not inherently violate the Eighth
Amendment. The Court has noted, however, that some
applications of the death penalty are cruel and unusual and has
thus created categorical exceptions for certain people otherwise
eligible for the death penalty, including people with intellectual
disabilities as in Atkins v. Virginia.217
Despite this categorical exclusion, people with intellectual
disabilities are not safe from improper execution, as many states
have evaluative schemes based entirely on bright-line IQ score
cutoffs—and these states often cherry pick which scores to
consider. While the Supreme Court prohibited the use of such
score maximums in Hall v. Florida, the Court again failed to
give a metric by which to effectively and properly evaluate capital
defendants’ potential intellectual disabilities. By implementing a
statewide scheme that evaluates capital defendants’ conceptual,
social, and practical deficiencies while also taking into account the
error inherent in IQ testing, the justice system can ensure that all
those with true intellectual disabilities are excluded from a death
sentence. In a society that is quick to define its citizens by their
quantitative metrics, it must be remembered no one number
216 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014)
(No. 12-10882). Despite movement in the psychological community away from the
terms “mentally retarded” and “retarded” more generally, this terminology is
unfortunately still commonplace, as is demonstrated by Justice Breyer’s passing use here.
Negative colloquial use of such terminology is one reason for this change in terminology
in the professional psychological community, but unfortunately, its continued use only
furthers the stigma associated with being intellectually disabled. See supra notes 10, 2224 and accompanying text.
217 Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
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can define a person—particularly in the cases of Daryl Atkins,
Freddie Lee Hall, and Marvin Lee Wilson, and especially not
for those intellectually disabled defendants still fighting for
justice at sentencing.
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